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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the background to five major policy questions facing European 
Governments seeking to encourage the growth of SME’s: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Has the balance of constraints on SME growth shifted, such that institutional 
sources of funds is no longer a major constraint? 
Is there an over-emphasis upon the adequate provision of seed corn finance? 
Will SME’s ever be able to start up and grow without the provision of subsidised 
finance? 
What is the role of public and private sectors in these developments? 
Is it time to adopt a more consistent pan-European policy for SME’s? 
Inevitably, the answers to these questions require value judgements about the scope of 
Government intervention. This paper attempts simply to set out a framework for making these 
judgements. 
2. THE FUNDING PROFILE OF SME’$ 
There is a dearth of reliable statistics on SME’s and a notorious lack of consistency in 
international statistics. It is also well known that statistics on the financial data of small firms 
are the most fragile of all since, not only are they affected by the different accounting and tax 
practices followed in various countries, but they are also largely at the discretion of the 
proprietor of the SME. There are virtually no data bases which permit a consistent international 
comparison of the financial structure and funding of SME’s. 
One international survey covering the UK, USA, France, Japan and Israel was conducted by 
Tamari’. His data is now rather old (1964 to 1973) and, as is still the case today, the definition 
of SME’s vary from country to country. His broad conclusions, however, have been verified by 
more recent research in the UK2. They were: 
1. SME’s operate with gearing ratios (debt to total funds) similar to or higher than large 
firms. 
2. The proportion of debt represented by long term loans in SME’s is significanctly lower 
than for large companies. 
3. SME’s are significantly more dependent on creditor finance than large companies. 
Table 1 summarises UK research data on financial structures over the 20 year period 1962 to 
1982. 
Tamari’s research would also seem to suggest that shareholders loans are a significant element in 
funding SME’s, varying between 11% of total assets in the USA, 18% in France, 6% in Japan, 
22% in Israel and 3% in the UK. (The Wilson Report put this figure at 11% in the UK by 
1975). 
This high gearing with a heavy dependence on short term funds is normally seen as inherently 
risky and unstable. It perhaps goes some way to explain the general lower investment by SME’s 
in fixed tangible assets than large companies, and must mean that SME’s are not as well placed 
to weather economic recession. To redress this imbalance would require the input of long term 
equity capital. 
3. THE LIFE CYCLE DYNAMIC AND EOUITY CAPITAL 
The nature of long term equity capital which is appropriate and available to small businesses 
varies as a new venture progresses through its life cycle. Figure 1 illustrates the types of equity 
capital appropriate to new ventures at various stages of this life cycle. It is adapted from 
Vickery4 who based the life cycle stages on work by Churchill and Lewis’. 
As can be seen, the nature and variety of equity capital is very wide. Virtually all businesses 
will have to rely heavily on owners’ equity in the early stages of the life cycle. 
However not all new businesses will have access to the other forms of venture capital listed. 
Most new businesses grow only in the first few years after start up and then reach some 
equilibrium level at which the owner-manager is provided with an adequate, independent life 
style. The company can stay at this stage indefinitely provided environmental change does not 
destroy its market niche or ineffective management reduce its competative advantage. 
Equilibrium businesses of this sort are unlikely to seek additional equity once equilibrium is 
reached. It is simply not needed. In addition equity involvement at earlier stages will be less 
attractive to outside backers, even if the owner-manager were to seek it. Also, owner-managers 
have been traditionally reluctant to relinquish ownership of their company by bringing in other 
shareholders. 
It is therefore new ventures with growth potential that are most likely to seek, and indeed need 
additional equity capital. 
3. INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF EOUITY CAPITAL 
In a survey of European small business, Burns and Dewhurst concluded: 
‘The UK seems to lead the other (European) countries in the number of institutional 
sources of equity for unquoted companies. Institutional providers of venture capital are 
only just emerging in many of the countries surveyed’. 
In the UK, Investors in Industry (31) dominates the institutional providers and is probably the 
largest institution in the world of its kind. As of March 1986, it held long term investments in 
some 4800 unquoted companies. Average investment is some f200 million annually in new loans 
and equity. 
One aspect in the encouragement of non participant individuals to invest in SME is taxation. 
Here again the same survey concluded that: 
‘Britain stands out with its bold and generous Business Expansion Scheme (BES)’ 
Introduced in 1981, the scheme allows the deduction of up f40,OOO in any one year from an 
individual’s tax liability for investment in unquoted trading (and some other) companies 
incorporated and resident in the UK. Investors can also claim relief by investing in an 
approved investment fund. About f240 million was raised from private investors in two years 
from 1983 - 85 for investment in over 1400 companies, about half of the investments are of 
amounts less than f50,OOO. A survey by Peat Marwick in 1986 concluded: 
Without BES: 
1. 94% of finance invested by individuals would not have gone to particular companies. 
2. 93% would not have been invested in UK unquoted companies. 
3. 73% would not have been invested in equities in general. 
None of the countries in the survey had any scheme approaching the generosity of the UK 
scheme. Although Denmark had no special incentives for investment by non-participants, it did 
have a scheme whereby wage-earners under 40 could make deductible deposits of up to 200/6 of 
their income in an ‘establishment account’ and use it for setting up their own business. In 
France, private individuals could invest up to FF.7000 a year in quoted or unquoted companies 
and claim a 25% tax credit West Germany, the Republic of Ireland, Italy and Switzerland had 
no specific tax incentives for non participants. 
In the UK, the existence of the 3rd Market, and the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) as well 
as the share repurchase provisions of the 1981 Companies Act has enhanced the marketability of 
investment in unquoted companies and provided valuable ‘take-off stage financing for growth 
businesses. 
Since its creation in November 1980, the USM has seen spectacular growth. It has created over 
650 millionaires. Statistics recently produced by accountants Touche Ross chart the spectacular 
growth in terms of funds raised. 
E’million New Issue Raised by 
existing 
Shareholders 
Total raised inc. 
riehts issues 
First 17 months 49.7 36.3 130 
Calender 1984 NA 86.6 NA 
Calender 1985 NA 90.3 NA 
Calender 1986 152.2 140.6 436.8 
The USM now lists about 500 companies with a capitalisation approaching f5 billion. 
There is some evidence in the UK that the availability of equity funds now exceeds the business 
opportunities to invest in. Many new issues on the USM are greatly oversubscribed. The 
launch of the Sock Shop in May was 53 times oversubscribed. A number of BES investment 
funds are not invested. In the eighties there was an explosion of venture capital funds. There is 
now an established group of Venture Capital managers whose very business existence depends 
upon them finding a stream of suitable investments, and frequently comment on the difficulty 
of doing SO. In the UK even ‘seed’ and ‘start up’ equity is becoming more easily available. 
There are a number of local schemes to ‘marry’ investors with business needing finance, the best 
known being run by the London Enterprise Agency and currently being extended outside 
London. Also The Venture Capital Report, which has been published now for eight years, has 
raised some f20 million mainly for seed corn investments. The monthly publication carries at 
least ten investment opportunities each month giving details of the business, the entrepreneur, 
the finance sought and whether an active or passive partner is appropriate. 
However, in a recent survey of venture capital users8, two out of three respondents still rated 
lack of both personal and external finance as a serious or moderate problem when establishing 
their new business and 41% saw availability of capital as a major obstacle to further growth. 
5. LOAN FINANCE 
There are no published figures on the proportion of commercial bank lending to SME’s, and 
consequently it is impossible to evaluate the provision from one country to another. However, 
there are two areas of provision that relate specifically to small firms; credit guarantees that 
enable small firms to obtain bank loans that they would not otherwise obtain because of lack of 
collateral and subsidised loan capital for SME’s. 
The UK has its own Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme which guarantees 70 per cent of 
medium term loans now at a premium of 2$ per cent above commercial interest rates. 
Launched in 1981, the original scheme, which ran until 1984, helped 14,000 businesses with 
f450 million. However, bad debt claims exceeded income by f37 million. Britain’s only 
national ‘subsidised’ loan scheme is provided by the European Investment Bank and 
administered by Investors in Industry. There is a plethora of local and regional schemes 
directed towards encouraging investment in specific locations rather than in SME’s in particular, 
although there is some evidence that SME’s do not make as much use of these schemes as is 
often supposed. 
France has an extensive network of professional guarantee associations. There are well over 50 
‘Societes de Caution Mutuelle’ which provide these loan guarantees. They are self funding and 
charge a small premium for their guarantee. The government only recently entered the field 
through its ‘prets participatifs’ (participating loans) which are unsecured, long-term loans with 
variable interest rates linked to borrowers’ performance. These are intended to provide a semi- 
equity form of funding. A number of banks also provide subsidised loans to SME’s as well as 
to geographical regions and specific trades. 
West Germany has a government-backed credit guarantee scheme administered through private 
credit guarantee associations. These private associations have funds supplemented by loans and 
grants from the Lander and Federal Government, and normally focus on specific sectors. West 
Germany also has subsidised loans (often linked to loan guarantees) available through the 
commercial banking system. These are paid for by the European Recovery Programme. 
In the Republic of Ireland the Enterprise Development Programme provides both loan 
guarantees and loan subsidies. In Italy, although there is a state loan guarantee scheme, there 
seems little uptake. Even subsidised loans, although available, seem to be little used. Whilst 
Switzerland has a loan guarantee scheme, it does not have any form of loan subsidy for SME’s, 
although there is a plethora of local cantonal schemes. Denmark stands out as having very little 
by way of financing provision specifically for SME’s although it would seem true that most 
businesses in Denmark really are ‘small’. 
Again, in the UK, there is evidence that, despite cries to the contrary, there is adequate 
provision of loan finance for SME’s. Don Clarke, Finance Director for 31 recently wrote9: 
‘Dealing first with long-term debt, I have seen no signs of shortage. Had there been 
one, we at 31 would have had problems raising money ourselves; and what we did raise 
would have had to be rationed. But, at no time during my 18 years funding 31 has this 
happened. 
In passing he points out that much of this has come from overseas sources with 31 issuing over 
f 1000 million of debt to foreign investors since 1977. He comments that, given the bouyancy 
of the european market, they could have issued more ‘had there been the opportunity to invest 
it’. 
6. THE COST OF FUNDS 
Even if one accepts that there are ‘adequate’ institutional sources of debt and equity in Europe 
today, there is always the question of cost. The late seventies saw high rates of inflation in 
most European countries which in turn generated high interest rates. 
In the UK, since 1972 when 31 raised a 25 year loan stock at 87/8%, it has only once been able 
to raise money below 10% until a 93/8% issue in April this year. The rates of interest on a 20 
year debenture over the period 1970-86 are shown in Table 2. They show the steep rise during 
the late seventies but they also show how, as inflation came down in the eighties, interest rates 
did not follow. 
Table 2 also gives ‘real’ interest rates; the difference between the 20 year debenture stock and 
the inflation rate. The inevitable conclusion is that real interest rates have never been higher. 
The rate of interest at any time is the result of supply, demand and some government 
intervention. The prime causes of interest rate levels and fluctuations are often disputed, 
however, Governments’ own borrowing requirements certainly play an important part. In the 
UK the late seventies saw an increase in Government borrowing requirements which probably 
not only forced up interest rates but also inflation rates. At the same time many companies 
were very unwilling borrowers as they had to borrow to fill the cash flow gap caused by 
inflation. The crisis of 1980/81 caused many UK companies to grasp the unattractive nettle of 
reducing costs by reducing capacity and improving efficiency rather than accepting the 
palliative of filling cash flow gaps with borrowed money. Since then gearing levels for UK 
companies of all sizes have drifted down and at the same time profitability has improved2. 
Returned earnings and borrowings in the eighties have increasingly been used to finance growth 
opportunities. 
Since SME’s generally have high gearing ratios than large firms they are particularly hard hit by 
these high interest rates and any conclusions about improvements in sources of funds over the 
period must be tempered by the high cost of those funds in the eighties. 
7. POLICY ISSUES 
This brief review of SME financing and the provision of equity and loan funds in Europe, leads 
directly to a number of interesting issues: 
1. Has the balance of constraints on SME growth shifted, such that institutional provision 
of funds is no longer the major constraint? 
There is some tentative evidence in the UK, where the institutional sources of bank and 
equity finance are now very good, that the problem has become one of finding 
sufficiently profitable investment opportunities, not the funds to invest in them. This 
does beg the question of ‘sufficiently profitable’ (i.e. sufficient, at least to meet the 
financing cost), however, should subsidy be given to less profitable ventures? Would 
state resources be better directed towards improving the volume of profitable investment 
opportunities? If so, how? 
2. Is there an over-emphasis on the adequate provision of seed corn finance? 
Most SME’s will either go out of business early in their life or reach some equilibrium 
in their development that they will not go beyond. It is unlikely that owner managers in 
these equilibrium firms will want to share ownership. It is equally unlikely that 
investment in them will be attractive to institutions. It is also clear that the 
administrative cost of such equity is very high relative to the investment making it of 
questionable benefit to anything other than those SME’s with growth potential Is the 
tremendous growth of credit guarantees and subsidised loan capital throughout Europe is 
now starting to meet the start-up capital needs of these SME’s? 
3. Will SME’s ever be able to start up and grow without the use of subsidised finance? 
SME’s have higher gearing ratios than larger companies and often face higher interest 
charges. However there are certain fixed costs associated with the provision of capital 
(e.g. legal and monitoring costs) which make the provision of small amounts of capital 
expensive. Can and should there be a policy of reducing subsidies over a period such 
that SME’s have to face the true economic cost of funding? 
4. What is the role of public and private sectors in these developments? 
The UK has built upon the private sector institutional framework by providing 
guarantees and incentives (e.g. BES). Is this the way forward, rather than setting up 
new governmental bodies? 
5. Is it time to adopt a more consistent pan-European policy for SME’s? 
National policies vary greatly. Some countires rely upon Government intervention, 
others rely upon the free market. SME’s get very different treatment in different 
countries and, unlike their larger counterparts, find it difficult to look to the 
international market place for help. Is this fair? 
Over the last twenty years European governments have focussed increasingly on SME’s and 
developed policies to encurage their formation and growth. Over that period the provision of 
institutional capital for SME’s has improved vastly. In that any form of subsidy to any sector 
needs to be reviewed periodically, subsidies towards capital provision for SME’s also need to be 
reviewed. In particular, given the objective of encouraging the formation and growth of SME’s, 
are there other ways in which this ‘subsidy’ can be more effectively used to help the SME 
sector? 
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Table 2 : Interest Rates in the UK 1979 -86 
5kaE 
1970 : 
tO 
debenture 
yield % 
9.9 
1971 : 9.6 
1972 : 9.7 
1973 : 11.4 
1974 : 16.4 
1975 : 16.0 
1976 : 15.2 
1977 : 13.4 
1978 : 12.8 
1979 : 13.2 
1980 : 14.2 
1981 : 15.4 
1982 : 14.0 
1983 : 12.1 
1984 : 11.8 
1985 : 11.5 
1986 : 10.8 
‘Real’ Interest % 
3.5 
0.2 
2.6 
2.3 
0.4 
-8.2 
-1.3 
-2.4 
4.5 
-0.2 
-3.8 
3.5 
5.4 
7.5 
6.8 
5.4 
7.4 
l ‘Real’ interest is the difference between these 20 year debenture yields and the inflation rate. 
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